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• The crisis is undermining the drivers of globalisation – open markets, FDI,
private ownership – and there is a risk of a protectionist backlash and
economic fragmentation.
• The international community, notably the G20, must combat this slide by
operating on a broad policy front, including trade, financial integration,
macroeconomic policy and reform of international financial institutions.
• The key ‘must-dos’: preserve trade flows, ensure that national aid
programmes do not distort global competition, avoid exchange-rate
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representative of new global realities.
• The G20 can be a real force for good if it can harness the analytical
firepower of existing international institutions.
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RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
JEAN PISANI-FERRY AND INDHIRA SANTOS,MARCH 2009
THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL TURMOILengulfing
the world marks the first crisis of the current era of
globalisation. Considerable country experience
has been accumulated on financial crises in indi-
vidual countries or regions – which policymakers
can use to design remedial policies. But there has
not been a world financial crisis in most people’s
living memory. And the experience of the 1930s
is frightening because governments at that time
proved unable to preserve economic integration
and develop cooperative responses.
Even before this crisis, globalisation was already
being challenged. Despite exceptionally
favourable global economic conditions, not every-
one bought into the benefits of global free trade
and movement of capital and jobs. Although econ-
omists, corporations, and some politicians were
supportive, critics argued that globalisation
favoured capital rather than labour and the
wealthy rather than the poor.
Now the crisis and the national responses to it
have started to reshape the global economy and
shift the balance between the political and eco-
nomic forces at play in the process of globalisa-
tion. The drivers of the recent globalisation wave –
open markets, the global supply chain, globally in-
tegrated companies, and private ownership – are
being undermined, and the spirit of protectionism
has re-emerged. And once-footloose global com-
panies are returning to their national roots.
So what role has globalisation played in the gene-
sis and development of the crisis? How is the
global economy being transformed? And what are
the possible policy responses? These are the key
questions we address in this policy contribution.
MORE THAN REGULATORY FAILURES
At the start, many analysts failed to grasp fully the
character of the crisis. The focus was almost ex-
clusively on market regulation and the supervi-
sion of financial institutions, whereas little
attention was devoted to the root global macro-
economic causes of the crisis. Indeed, as late as
November last year, when the Group of Twenty
(G20) leading industrial and emerging market
economies issued a communiqué at the end of an
emergency meeting in Washington DC, the main
focus was on failures in regulation and supervi-
sion and, correspondingly, the remedies were con-
sidered to be of a regulatory nature – hence the
long G20 agenda.
Partly, this was because the expected crisis did
not occur: there was no precipitous depreciation
of the US currency, nor a sell-off of US Treasury
bonds. But the truth was that, however real the mi-
croeconomic failures, their effect would have been
much more contained absent the insatiable ap-
petite for AAA-rated US assets. It was the combi-
nation of strong international demand for such
assets, largely in connection with the accumula-
tion of current account surpluses in emerging and
oil-rich economies, and an environment of per-
verse economic incentives and poor regulation
that proved to be explosive.
However, the complex interrelationships in the
global system helped mask how it operated, and
for a long time there was a collective failure to
grasp fully the link between global payments im-
balances and the demand for safe (or seemingly
safe) financial assets and the manufacturing of
those assets (Caballero, 2009). Discussion at the
international level was further complicated by po-
litical overtones: ever since Ben Bernanke’s 2005‘There is an urgent need to avoid the recessionary combination of the drying-up of capital
flows to emerging and developing economies and an accumulation of large foreign exchange
reserves. The danger is very real.’
Jean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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‘global savings glut’ hypothesis, the United States
has insisted that the key macroeconomic problem
in the world economy was not its current account
deficit, but rather China’s high propensity to save.
A second related mistake dates to the early stages
of the crisis. It was hoped, until autumn 2008, that
economies immune from the direct fallout of the
sub-prime crisis would sail through the stormwith
sufficient strength to pull along the entire world
economy.
There were some superficial grounds for this ‘de-
coupling’ view. According to the IMF, US banks suf-
fered 57 percent of the financial sector losses on
US-originated securitised debt, and European
banks suffered 39 percent, but Asian institutions
took only a 4 percent hit (IMF, 2008). This explains
the simultaneous drying up of liquidity on the in-
terbank markets in Europe and the United States
in summer 2007 and is consistent with a degree
of transatlantic financial integration far more in-
tense than between any other pair of regions
(Cohen-Setton and Pisani-Ferry, 2008). Thus, the
subprime mortgage-related clogging of the bank-
ing system, and the resulting credit crunch, were
mainly a US-European phenomenon.
But it is now apparent that growth is declining
sharply in all regions of the world.The decoupling
hopes were put to rest on September 15, 2008,
with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and its
consequences for capital markets. Vividly repre-
sented by the IMF’s ‘heat map’ of the crisis (Blan-
chard, 2008), emerging and developing markets
were almost immediately hit by the sharp rise in
risk aversion and the resulting sudden stop of cap-
ital inflows. The shock was especially severe for
capital-importing countries, notably in central and
eastern Europe, where it compounded pre-exist-
ing imbalances and prompted calls for IMF assis-
tance. But it was severe also for those that had
accumulated foreign exchange reserves, such as
Korea. The channel of transmission here was net
capital flows rather than capital market integra-
tion in the form of gross external assets and lia-
bilities (some of these countries held almost no
US assets or mainly held treasury bonds, whose
value has increased in recent months). Net pri-
vate capital flows to emerging economies had
dwindled at end-2008 and are now projected to be
$165 billion in 2009, 82 percent below the 2007
level (IIF, 2009). Once again, the high volatility of
international capital flows has been a powerful
factor in crisis contagion.
Finally, trade was bound to be a major channel of
transmission for East Asia, whose combined ex-
ports to North America and Europe amount to a
staggering 12 percent of the region’s GDP. This was
enough to make decoupling an illusion. Trade has
not only been a vector of contagion, but an accel-
erator. Figures for end-2008 show world trade and
industrial production declining in tandem at dou-
ble-digit rates. Several Asian countries have seen
their exports fall by 10 to 20 percent year on year.
It is not possible yet to disentangle what can be
attributed to a fall in demand and the adjustment
of inventories and what is the result of clogging of
trade finance. What is clear is that the contraction
of international trade is both a channel of trans-
mission and a factor in the acceleration of output
contraction.
Beyond the specifics of shock transmission, the
crisis has exposed that, in spite of regional
integration and the emergence of new economic
powers, the global economy lacks resilience. After
all, the losses on sub-prime and Alt-A mortgages
that set in motion the dramatic deleveraging
process amounted to some $100 billion; in other
words, just 0.7 percent of US GDP and 0.2 percent
of world GDP – a trivial amount by any standard.
With the world economy now having succumbedRESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMYJean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos
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to recession, the questions are what toll it will take
on globalisation and how national economies and
international organisations can manage the
ongoing changes.
GLOBALISATION: RESHAPING OR UNMAKING?
The crisis has already started to affect the drivers
behind rapid globalisation in recent years – pri-
vate ownership, globally integrated companies,
the global supply chain, and open markets.
To start with, public participation in the private
sector has increased significantly in the past few
months(see chart). Of the 50 largest banks in the
US and the EU, 23 and 15, respectively, have re-
ceived public capital injections; that is, banks rep-
resenting respectively 76 and 40 percent of
pre-crisis market capitalisation depend today on
taxpayers. Other sectors, such as the automobile
and insurance industries, have also received pub-
lic assistance. Whatever the governments’ inten-
tion, public support is bound to affect the
behaviour of once-footloose global firms.
Second, this crisis challenges globally-integrated
companies. Economic integration in the past quar-
ter century has been driven largely by companies’
search for cost-cutting and talent. Yet globally in-
tegrated companies were first put to the test early
on in the crisis, with the collapse of banks that
acted across international borders. Once-mighty
transnational institutions were suddenly at pains
to identify which government would support them.
In some cases, governments responded coopera-
tively – as in the case of Belgium and France with
Dexia Bank – but other cases ended in a breakup
along national lines – as with Fortis, a Belgian-
Dutch lender and insurer. This not only made clear
that the existing supervision and regulation sys-
tems were inadequate for this transnational com-
pany model, but also showed that only national
governments had the budgetary resources re-
quired to bail out financial institutions. Public aid
risks turning global companies into national
champions. Today, no CEO of a firm that has re-
ceived public support would echo the words of
Manfred Wennemer (CEO of Continental, a German
tire maker): when justifying layoffs at the com-
pany’s Hanover plant in 2005, he said: ‘My duty is
to my 80,000 workers worldwide’ (The Economist,
May 18, 2006).
Third, national responses to the crisis can lead to
economic and financial fragmentation. There is ini-
tial evidence that as governments ask banks to
continue lending to domestic customers, credit is
being rationed disproportionately in foreign mar-
kets. This was what happened recently when the
Dutch government asked ING Bank to expand do-
mestic lending while reducing its overall balance
sheet. Because companies in emerging and less-
developed economies depend largely on foreign
credit, this leaves them especially vulnerable to fi-
nancial protectionism. Furthermore, government
aid – driven by a legitimate concern with jobs –
often, implicitly at least, shows preferences for the
local economy. The French bias toward domestic
employment in its auto industry’s plan, the US
‘Buy American’ provision in the stimulus bill, and
UK prime minister Gordon Brown’s now infamous
‘British jobs for British workers’ slogan are but a
few examples.
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Capital injections in banks
Maximum sum announced to
be allocated to capital injections 
Injecting public money: banks are relying increasingly on taxpayer funds.
(Size of public recapitalisations, percent of GDP)
Sources: US Treasury, European Commission, national governments, and Bruegel calculations.
Note: Data as of Feb. 11, 2009. Amounts restricted to Tier 1 capital injections. The starred countries did
not specify a maximum amount of total intervention.Jean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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Last but not least, despite the G20’s commitment
last November not to increase tariffs, these have
gone up since the start of the crisis in several
countries, from India and China to Ecuador and
Argentina. This follows a similar move one year
ago when export restraints were introduced as
countries tried to isolate domestic consumers
from increasing international food prices.
It is hard to say if these changes are merely short-
term reactions to a major shock or if they
represent new and concerning trends. At the very
least, the balance between political and economic
forces has been significantly altered. Because
political support for globalisation was at best
shallow while the global economy was in a
buoyant state, this suggests the pendulum is now
swinging in the opposite direction. Against this
background, two lessons from history are worth
keeping in mind. One, dismantling protectionist
measures takes time. It took several decades for
many of the trade barriers erected during the
interwar period to be brought down. Second, even
if a significant part of the progress in liberalising
trade in recent times has been institutionalised
and strong reversals à la 1930s are not likely, the
downward spiral of protectionism acts fast.
Taken together, these risks pose a significant
challenge for global integration. This is true also
at the regional level. Economic divergence is rising
within Europe, and cooperation within East Asia
has been limited to say the least, in spite of the
violent shock affecting the region.
No doubt, global governance and the economic
landscape will emerge from this crisis reshaped.
The main test remains fostering international co-
operation at a time when there is a temptation to
look for solutions at home. Answers to the current
challenges lie in deeper multilateralism, rather
than in nationalism. But what exactly should
global actors and national governments do?
THE POLICY AGENDA
The evidence suggests that reforms of the
regulatory and supervisory frameworks are only
part of the answer. At its next meeting in April, the
G20 needs to turn to a broader set of issues that
includes trade, financial integration, and
macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, policy
cooperation at the global level requires an
adequate institutional framework; for this reason,
the reform of international financial institutions is
once again bound to be on the menu of
discussions. Therefore, we suggest a five-point
agenda, with the first three issues referring to
global trade and the macro agenda and the last
two to tasks for the international financial
institutions.
Preserve trade integration.There is an urgent need
to avoid actions that can make the crisis and the
contagion worse. The November G20 commitment
to ‘refrain from raising new barriers to investment
or to trade in goods and services, imposing new
export restrictions, or implementing WTO [World
Trade Organisation]-inconsistent measures to
stimulate exports’ is clearly insufficient. From in-
creases in applied tariffs, subsidies, and biased
public procurement to mandated bank lending to
domestic customers and pressures on manufac-
turing and services companies to preserve jobs at
home, the G20 commitment leaves many routes
to protectionism wide open. Instead, governments
in the G20 should agree on a code of conduct that
establishes which rescue and support measures
are acceptable or not in times of crisis (whether
they affect trade directly or indirectly) and entrust
the WTO and the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development with the policy monitor-
ing task. Similar provisions should apply at the
regional level.
Design national stimulus programmes and aid
packages that support globalisation rather than
‘In a deep recession, there is a temptation to export unemployment through beggar-thy-
neighbour exchange rate policies. This has not yet been the case on a significant scale, but
the need to avoid such measures must be reaffirmed immediately.’RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMYJean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos
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undermine it. Governments should take stock of
plans made at the G20 November meeting to
foster global recovery through stimulus packages,
and review the size and adequacy of efforts
announced so far. International cooperation in this
field is by nature delicate because, as bluntly
stated by an Irish minister, “From Ireland’s point
of view, the best sort of fiscal stimulus are those
being put in place by our trading partners.
Ultimately these will boost demand for our exports
without costing us anything” (Willie O’Dea,
Minister of Defence, in the Irish Independent,
January 4, 2009). Packages announced so far
vary greatly in terms of size and content and, even
when they do not include any distorting
measures, many tend to favour supply measures
in industries with high local content, such as
infrastructure. This is perfectly legal and, to a
certain degree, inevitable because governments
are accountable to national taxpayers who want
to benefit from the injection of public money. But
it is not efficient because the tradable goods
sector is (with construction) the one most
affected by the crisis. As a stopgap measure, the
G20 should agree on a set of principles concerning
the content of national stimulus and support
packages and include their potentially most
distorting elements in the code of conduct
proposed above.
Avoid exchange rate policies that trigger external
instability.In a deep recession, the temptation to
export unemployment through beggar-thy-
neighbour exchange rate policies inevitably
arises. Fortunately, this has not yet been the case
on a significant scale, but for the future, the G20
should reaffirm the need to avoid such measures
and ask the IMF to carry out real-time exchange
rate monitoring and report infringements immedi-
ately. This principle was agreed in 2007, and it is
of particular relevance in the present context.
Build confidence in multilateral insurance rather
than self-insurance. There is an urgent need to
avoid the recessionary combination of drying-up
capital flows to emerging and developing
economies and an accumulation of large foreign
exchange reserves. The danger is very real. Most
emerging economies have been suffering from a
sudden stop of capital inflows (or capital flow re-
versals) with dire consequences, especially in
central and eastern Europe – the one region of the
world that had until recently relied on foreign cap-
ital to catch up. Moreover, the lesson many may
draw from the crisis is that there is a need for even
more reserves to self-insure against such events.
This would imply, including in Asia where reserves
are already high, a widespread move toward cur-
rent account surpluses at the worst possible time
– an international ‘paradox of thrift.’ Moreover, in
addition to contributing to the crisis by fuelling ex-
cess demand for US financial  assets, reserve ac-
cumulation is an individually costly and
collectively inefficient way to protect against
crises stemming from a lack of confidence in mul-
tilateral insurance through international financial
institutions, especially the IMF. Rather, there is a
need to rebuild confidence in the system. The level
of resources this requires and the best combina-
tion of multilateral and regional insurance needed
to achieve this goal are legitimate topics for dis-
cussion. There is no reason for the combination to
be uniform across regions, but, whatever the form,
it would result in significant capital savings.
Make international financial institutions more
representative of current realities.The recent re-
form of quota and voice at the IMF has evidently
not been sufficient to create or recreate the
needed ownership in the emerging and develop-
ing world, which is why further governance reform
should be on the agenda. The G20 has mandated
that ministers prepare proposals to reform inter-
national financial institutions, including giving
‘Giving greater voice and representation to emerging and developing economies is an
indispensable change that in practical terms implies a reduction in the number of European
seats and the renunciation of the US veto power.’Jean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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greater voice and representation to emerging and
developing economies. This indispensable change
– which in practical terms implies a reduction in
the number of European seats and the renuncia-
tion of the US veto power – will be easier to
achieve if the debate over power redistribution is
put in a broader context (as suggested above).
The tasks ahead for the G20 are daunting, but the
G20 is the right venue for dealing with them.
Admittedly, many of the items in the November
2008 declaration were primarily the responsibility
of the countries or regions with the most
sophisticated financial markets. In contrast,
ensuring that in the short term the crisis does not
result in economic fragmentation and that
international trade and finance do not become
powerful engines of economic contraction, re-
quires a wider forum, such as the G20. If G20
governments can successfully link to existing
international institutions and rely on their an-alytical
capabilities, it could mean the transformation of the
crisis into an opportunity for stronger and more
legitimate governance of globalisation.   
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